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Hume	and Reid: 
A common legacy
Lord Stewart Sutherland
My	favourite	quotation	from	Hume	is	a	warning:	‘the	errors	in	religion	
are	 dangerous;	 those	 in	 philosophy	 only	 ridiculous.’1	The	warning,	
in	other	words,	 is	 this	–	 that	 if	we	get	religion	wrong	some	terrible	
things	can	follow.	Maybe	for	a	century	or	so	nobody	quite	believed	
that,	but	today,	whether	it’s	in	shape	of	some	very	right-wing	forms	
of	Christianity	in	America,	or	in	the	risks	of	extreme	forms	of	Islam	
resurrecting	themselves,	mistakes	in	religion	really	are	dangerous!	All	
the	more	reason	to	turn	to	the	likes	of	Hume	and	Reid	because	there	
are	things	they	wrote	that	are	still	relevant	in	what	they	have	to	say	
to	us.	The	word	‘relevant’	appears	at	some	point	in	my	briefing	and	I	
will	try	and	provide	an	example	of	where	I	think	Hume’s	analysis	of	
contemporary	society	is	highly	relevant.	Indeed	I	even	used	it	as	a	basis	
for	asking	a	question	in	the	House	of	Lords	just	before	Christmas.	They	
have	this	system	of	questions	and	one	of	the	questions	laid	down	was	
whether	ethics	had	a	part	to	play	in	business	and	finance	in	the	City.	
People	debated	it	and	argued	about	the	composition	of	remuneration	
committees,	boards	and	non-executives	and	so	on.	I	thought	it	was	time	
to	ask	a	very	radical	question	and	my	mentor,	David	Hume	pointed	me	
in	 the	 right	direction.	The	question	was	 roughly	 this:	 ‘David	Hume	
argued	that	greed,	which	he	defined	as	the	avidity	to	acquire	property,	
money	and	wealth,	is	destructive	of	modern	society.	Does	the	Minister	
think	that	Hume	could	possibly	be	right	and	if	so,	what	can	be	done	
about	it?’	Hume’s	question	couldn’t	be	more	pointed.	I	hope	to	come	
back	to	it.	Hume,	arguing	from	a	secular	position,	laid	down	certain	
tests	of	what	a	healthy	society	might	be	like	and	how	sustainable	it	
might	be.	I	hope	to	demonstrate	how	that	came	about.
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A	common	legacy:	John	Knox	and	power	and	authority
To	 go	 back	 to	 the	 starting	 point,	 Hume	 and	 Reid,	 had	 a	 common	
legacy	which	originates	as	far	back	as	the	sixteenth	century.	There	are	
two	elements	to	that	legacy	that	I	wish	to	draw	your	attention	to.	One	
is	the	Reformation	and	the	other	is	the	legacy	of	Isaac	Newton	through	
his	redefinition	of	our	understanding	of	the	physical	world.	
Both	 of	 these	 factors	 were	 fundamental	 to	 the	 legacy	 that	
helped	 build,	 amongst	 other	 things,	 the	 Scottish	 Enlightenment	 in	
the	 way	 it	 developed,	 factors	 influential	 for	 both	 Hume	 and	 Reid.	
The	 Reformation	 legacy	 lay	 in	 the	 problem	 that	 John	 Knox	 had	
of	 establishing	 the	 politically legitimate	 –	 the	 problem,	 that	 is,	 of	
establishing	where	authority	lies	and	how	to	distinguish	it	from	mere	
exercise	of	power.	This	was	an	issue	of	profound	complexity	because	
the	difference	between	authority	and	power	was	not	something	 that	
was	apparent	in	Scotland	in	the	sixteenth	century.	Authority	belonged	
to	the	noble	who	had	the	biggest	gang	of	thugs	standing	behind	him.	
That’s	how	you	exercised	power	and	that’s	how	authority	was	derived	
and	exercised	in	sixteenth-century	Scotland.	
Knox	 was	 aware	 of	 this	 and	 was	 trying	 to	 establish	 a	 form	 of	
society	 from	 new,	ab initio.	Now,	 does	 the	 solution	 lie	 in	working	
out	who	 is	 the	most	powerful	of	 the	nobles	 and	 then	 inviting	 them	
to	back	 the	 social	 system	–	 if	 not	 then	what?	For	Knox	 this	was	 a	
major	intellectual	task.	We	rarely	hear	much	of	this	side	of	him	–	what	
we	mostly	hear	about	him	is	his	lecturing	of	Mary,	Queen	of	Scots.	
The	 Knox	 we	 are	 accustomed	 to	 hear	 about	 argues	 about	 religion	
and	church	government	–	but	a	fundamental	issue	for	Knox	was	how	
to	 establish	 where	 authority	 lies	 and	 what	 the	 shape	 of	 Scotland’s	
constitution	would	be.	
We	 are	 still	 arguing	 about	 that.	 This	 was	 the	 problem	 that	 lay	
before	him	and	to	resolve	it	he	could	not	adopt	the	English	solution.	
The	English	solution	had	been	built	up	over	hundreds	of	years	and	it	
was	an	appeal	to	tradition,	to	continuity,	to	300	years	since	the	Magna	
Carta	of	finding	ways	to	exercise	authority.	Kings	and	Queens	were	
powerful,	but	nonetheless	there	was	a	continuing	strand	that	eventually	
developed	 into	 English	Case	 Law.	 English	 law	 is	 very	 different	 to	
Scottish	law.	In	English	law	you	refer	to	the	case	that	set	the	precedent	
T
page 7
that	now	establishes	what	you	do	in	the	case	in	front	of	you.	This	is	
a	very	different	way	of	 setting	a priori principles,	principles	which	
drive	the	law	of	the	land.	Now	that’s	how	it	worked	in	England	and	
worked	in	a	way	that	was	very	congenial.	It	was,	in	its	way,	colloquial,	
but	behind	it	 lay	a	huge	legacy	of	written	archives,	written	records,	
and	records	of	 legal	cases.	It	was	all	 there	and	you	could	argue	out	
your	position	by	referring	to	these	written	records	that	existed	then	as	
they	still	exist	now.	This	is	what	was	missing	in	Scotland.	
Knox	 wanted	 to	 settle	 an	 argument	 about	 where	 authority	 lay,	
about	the	division	between	State	and	Church,	between	the	King	and	
any	 parliament	 that	 arose	 –	 and	 he	 didn’t	 have	 the	 resources	 that	
were	there	in	England.	Here,	there	are	major	intellectual	differences	
in	 the	view	taken	of	society,	huge	differences.	 In	 terms	of	 the	Case	
Law	in	English	law,	the	records	of	written	individual	court	cases,	the	
records	of	 laws	 that	had	been	agreed	and	established,	 are	 all	 there.	
Not,	however,	in	Scotland.	So	what	could	Knox	do	about	it?	When	the	
issue	of	bishops	arose	in	the	church,	there	were	these	huge	arguments	
which	ran	well	beyond	Knox’s	time	as	to	whether	the	church	required	
them	or	not.	If	you	read	some	of	the	records	of	the	General	Assembly	
from	the	early	seventeenth	century	they	were	even	livelier	than	today!	
These	records	establish	how	the	arguments	were	developed	–	and	this	
was	not	as	in	England	where	they	would	refer	back	to	some	precedent.	
In	England,	 furthermore,	 those	who	were	 trying	 to	 impose	 bishops	
on	the	church,	used	analogies	such	as,	‘The	church	needs	a	bishop	in	
charge	just	as	a	hive	of	bees	needs	a	queen	bee	who	will	rule	the	roost	
and	set	the	pattern’.	These	analogies	and	patterns	from	nature	were	a	
straightforward	way	of	arguing	 in	England	and	 it	 shows	up	 in	 their	
philosophy.	There	are	philosophers	like	Bishop	Butler	who	lived	by	
this	analogical	argument.	All	running	back	to	the	fact	that	there	was	an	
established	tradition	and	everybody	could	refer	back	to	that	tradition.	
There	was	no	such	established	tradition	in	Scotland	–	which	is	a	
major	problem	for	any	new	state.	Look	round	today	at	what’s	happening	
in	Libya,	 in	Egypt,	or	Tunisia.	How	do	you	begin	to	establish	what	
the	ground	rules	are	in	a	way	that	they	will	be	respected?	That	was	
the	political	problem	that	confronted	John	Knox.	That’s	the	story	in	
summary	form,	but	it’s	a	very	fundamental	one.
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A	common	legacy	–	Isaac	Newton	and	empiricism
The	 second	 part	 of	 the	 legacy	 was	 that	 of	 Newton	 and	 all	 that	
surrounded	him.	Ranging	from	the	foundation	of	 the	Royal	Society	
to	the	many	individual	experimental	and	observational	scientists	who	
established	what	Hume	and	others	came	to	see	as	the	science	of	the	
natural	world.	Newton	said	‘Let	it	be	and	there	it	was’,	and	that	was	
how	 things	were.	His	was	 a	huge	 intellectual	weight	which	had	 its	
impact	in	Scotland	and	on	all	those	who	came	after	Newton,	both	in	
England	and	 in	Scotland,	and	of	course	elsewhere.	The	dual	 legacy	
remained,	however,	of	the	need	to	establish	and	sort	out	who	makes	
the	laws,	of	how	you	can	bring	a	case	and	be	fairly	and	justly	heard	on	
the	one	hand,	in	keeping	with	an	understanding	of	the	world	in	which	
we	 live	 on	 the	 other,	which	Newton	 had	 revolutionised.	Of	 course	
there	were	others	–	Keppler,	Galileo,	and	so	on	–	who	had	played	a	
major	part	in	that,	but	Newton,	it	seemed,	had	sorted	it	out.	
It	 was	 this	 dual	 legacy	 which	 forced	 the	 philosophers	 of	 the	
Enlightenment,	 principally	 Hume	 and	 Reid,	 to	 ask	 themselves	
fundamental	questions	from	first	principles.	We’ve	got	to	start	from	
somewhere.	In	deciding	what	kind	of	society	we	want,	where	do	we	
start	from?	What	will	maintain	society?	What	kind	of	moral	rules	will	
operate?	What	kind	of	moral	judgments	will	obtain?	(I	use	that	word	
deliberately.)	What	kind	of	moral	understanding	do	we	have?	Where	
do	these	issues	originate?	And	this	ties	up	with	the	political	question	
about	 where	 authority	 lies	 and	 the	 difference	 between	 authority	 –	
which	has	intellectual	content	to	it	and	has	its	own	way	of	resolving	
arguments	 –	 and	 power	 which	 pays	 no	 attention	 to	 argument:	 you	
just	send	the	troops	in!	Was	it	Hitler	who	said	of	the	Pope	‘We’re	his	
battalions!’?	Get	 the	 troops	behind	you	and	 that’s	 the	way	you	sort	
things	out!	
That’s	 not	 Knox’s	 concept	 of	 society.	 The	 questions	 that	
preoccupied	 him	 formed	 the	 legacy	 passed	 on	 to	 Hume	 and	 Reid.	
I’m	 encouraged	 by	 the	 fact	 that	Norman	Kemp-Smith,	 the	 greatest	
interpreter	 of	Hume	 in	 the	 twentieth	 century,	 in	 his	 introduction	 to	
Hume’s	Dialogues	(Hume’s	major	work	on	religion)	refers	to	Hume’s	
Calvinistic	legacy.	What	he	was	referring	to	was	the	awareness	that	
Knox	 had	 that	 there	 is	 an	 eternal	world	 that	 transcends	 this	world.	
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Hume	was	well	aware	of	 that	–	 the	pokiness	of	 the	world	 in	which	
we	live	now,	its	frailties	and	its	failures.	He	was	also	well	aware	that	
if	there	is	a	God	He	has	to	be	a	transcendent	God,	a	God	who	is	not	
simply	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 natural	 world.	 This	 problem	 runs	 right	
through	his	 understanding	of	 the	 relationship	between	God	and	 the	
world.	
This	led,	in	the	late	sixteenth	and	the	early	seventeenth	centuries,	to	
a	realisation	that	arguments,	reasons,	deductions,	inductions,	drawing	
conclusions	from	premises	are	important,	indeed	play	a	critical	part.	
Unless	 you	 could	 argue	 your	 corner	 you	would	 be	 nowhere	 in	 the	
major	political	 and	moral	 issues	of	 the	day.	You	couldn’t,	 after	 all,	
simply	 look	 up	Wikipedia!	You	 couldn’t	 look	 up	 a	 law	 book	 that	
would	tell	you	what	should	happen.	Such	matters	had	to	be	established	
from	first	principles	and	so	Hume	set	out	very	much	 in	a	Cartesian	
way	to	doubt	everything	that	he	could	doubt.	Thomas	Reid	did	so	too.	
Reid	had	significant	elements	of	scepticism	that	were	specific	to	him.	
He	doubted	what	 could	 be	 doubted	 because	 it	 could	 not	 simply	 be	
handed	on	by	tradition,	or	because	parents	had	said	it,	or	the	minister,	
or	the	General	Assembly.	There	had	to	be	reasons,	there	had	to	be	an	
argument,	a	way	of	establishing	points	and,	in	my	view,	this	led	to	a	
typically	 Scottish	 characteristic	 –	 argumentativeness.	This	 certainly	
goes	back	to	that	period.	Unless	you	could	argue	you	were	not	able	
to	 take	 part	 in	 the	 discussion.	No	use	 referring	 to	 tradition,	 no	 use	
referring	 to	ancient	continuities,	because	 that	particular	background	
was	insufficient.	Tradition	alone	was	not	going	to	solve	the	problem	of	
shaping	the	sort	of	society	human	beings	might	want	to	live	in.	
On	the	scientific	side,	Newton	had	established	the	workings	of	the	
universe,	and	in	so	doing	he	had	laid	out	a	pattern	that	just	dazzled	
everyone.	He	started	by	saying	that	the	earth	is	not	the	centre	of	the	
universe.	As	a	result,	ideas	about	human	beings	and	about	the	natural	
world	 were	 turned	 on	 their	 head.	 This	 led	 to	 the	 establishment	 of	
science	and	the	scientific	method	as	the	critical	way	of	solving	all	sorts	
of	problems.	Hume’s	response	could	be	summed	up	like	this,	‘Newton	
has	given	us	the	science	of	nature,	what	I	need	is	the	science	of	man’.	
These	days,	 I	dare	 say,	 it	would	probably	be	 ‘a	 science	of	persons’	
rather	 than	 ‘a	 science	 of	man’,	 but	 in	 other	words,	Hume	 seeks	 to	
understand	what	human	beings	are	like	in	a	way	that	is	comparable	
page 10
to	Newton’s	 establishment	 of	what	 the	 natural	world	 is	 like.	 If	we	
can	 only	 understand	what	 human	 beings	 are	 like	 we	will	 begin	 to	
understand	the	origins	of	moral	inclinations,	moral	perceptions,	moral	
insights	and	moral	sensitivities.	Hume	thought	the	route	to	doing	this,	
in	the	end,	was	to	understand	what	human	beings	are	like.	He	took	this	
very	seriously	and	indeed,	in	later	life,	wrote	a	series	of	magnificent	
histories.	His	great	History of England made	him	a	very	famous	and	
very	wealthy	man.	Here,	Hume	was	studying	human	beings	and	society	
by	observation	and	seeing	how	things	worked.	This	wasn’t	based	on	
a	theory	or	a	revelation	and	it	wasn’t	an	a priori set	of	principles	like	
Marxist	theory.	Hume	observed	human	beings	and	how	they	operated	
in	societies	and	on	the	basis	of	that	hoped	to	understand	where	moral	
convictions	and	notions	of	civil	society	come	from.	Out	of	this	study	
he	hoped	to	understand	further	how	human	beings	could	live	together	
in	a	way	that	didn’t	depend	on	who	had	the	most	troops	at	their	back.
This	parallel	with	science	was	very	congenial	to	many	intellectual	
Scots	at	the	time.	The	social	underpinning	of	the	great	names	of	the	
Enlightenment	were	 the	various	 intellectual	clubs	and	philosophical	
societies.	 These	 clubs	 and	 societies	 published	 journals	 and	 papers,	
some	 of	which	were	 about	 philosophy,	 but	 they	 could	 be	 about	 all	
sorts	of	subjects	–	the	natural	world	or	the	agrarian	world,	for	example.	
Benjamin	Franklin	published	one	of	his	papers	on	electricity	in	one	of	
the	collections	of	papers	published	by	what	was	to	become	the	Royal	
Society	of	Edinburgh.	This	was	part	of	the	way	in	which	intellectuals	
lived,	 they	had	all	understood	 that	 the	 idea	of	observing	nature	and	
seeing	what	was	 going	 on	 could	 be	 a	way	 of	 better	 understanding	
ourselves	and	the	way	in	which	we	live.	
An	example:	the	Great	Lisbon	Earthquake
Voltaire’s	Candide,	was	written	after	the	Great	Lisbon	Earthquake	of	
1755.	The	majority	who	died	in	the	disaster	were	those	Christians	who	
had	attended	church	 in	 the	city	because	 it	was	All	Saints	Day.	The	
pagans	had	all	gone	into	the	countryside	to	have	picnics,	wassailing	
and	wine	 and	 rounds	of	 cheese.	An	 intellectual	problem	arose	here	
because	of	 the	scale	of	 the	suffering.	That	single	event	 transformed	
a	 lot	of	 thinking	 in	Europe	–	 in	 fact,	 it	 turned	Europe	upside	down	
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in	terms	of	its	beliefs	–	and	in	Candide	Voltaire	gave	it	international	
status.	
In	Scotland,	as	elsewhere,	there	were	groups	of	people	around	the	
country	observing	nature.	One	of	the	consequences	of	the	earthquake	
was	a	tsunami	which	crossed	the	Atlantic	and,	as	recorded	in	diaries	and	
journals,	ended	up	in	the	West	Indies.	Tremors	were	recorded	in	Loch	
Lomond	in	Scotland	by	local,	mostly	amateur	scientific	observers.	In	
the	ten	days	following	the	earthquake	and	accompanying	tsunami	the	
resulting	changes	were	being	recorded	on	the	surface	of	the	lochs	of	
Scotland	and	collated	centrally.	Some	of	the	lochs	rose	three	feet	on	
the	day	and	the	day	following.	One	of	the	lochs	had	a	brewery	some	
eight	feet	above	the	level	of	the	loch	and	they	were	a	bit	worried	that	
the	waves	would	rise	high	enough	to	sweep	through	the	brewery!	All	
of	this	was	recorded	meticulously	by	ordinary	folk	in	Scotland,	many	
of	whom	at	 this	 time	engaged	 in	 this	minute	observation	of	nature.	
By	 1755,	 the	 year	 of	 the	 earthquake,	 there	 was	 a	 well-established	
observational	network,	evidence	that	the	scientific	way	of	looking	at	
things	was	 established	 in	 the	 community.	This	wasn’t	 two	 or	 three	
great	 intellectuals	or	 scientists	working	 together	–	 the	network	was	
established	right	in	the	community.	
A	methodology	established
So	there	you	have	a	dual	legacy	–	the	legacy	of	the	importance	and	
power	of	science	through	observation	and,	in	turn,	calculations	based	
on	 those	 observations	 which	 were	 followed	 by	 experiments.	Apart	
from	observation	of	earthquakes	there	were	lots	of	experiments,	and	
this	 approach	 developed	 in	 Scotland	 through	 various	 societies	 and	
groups.	The	Royal	Society	of	Edinburgh	was	formed	in	1783	and	was	
one	of	the	ways	in	which	this	was	further	institutionalised.
Hume	wanted	to	understand	human	beings	using	the	same	method.	
You	 couldn’t	 simply	 study	 humans	 by	 referring	 to	 the	 texts	 of	 the	
ancients.	The	older	philosophers	or	theologians	had	drawn	on	Plato	or	
Aquinas.	Now,	it	was	rather	a	case	of	‘we	have	seen	in	human	beings	
and	in	human	society	the	following	…	and	the	tentative	conclusions	
that	we	draw	are	...’.	One	of	the	results	of	the	scientific	method	and	the	
scepticism	practiced	by	Hume	and	Reid	was	that	there	were	no	final	
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hard	and	fast	conclusions.	This	way	of	understanding	was	the	legacy	
shared	by	Hume	and	Reid	but	there	was	one	difference	between	them.	
Hume	was	well	aware	of	the	legacy	of	the	Reformation	which	is	that	
there	is	a	transcendent	God	and	a	creation	which	is	not	transcendent,	
is	not	infinite	and	is	not	eternal.	Hume	was	aware	of	the	gap	between	
Creator	 and	 creation	 and	 he	 was	 not	 prepared	 to	 accept	 (and	 he	
and	Reid	differed	here)	 that	 just	by	 looking	at	 the	world	one	could	
infer	what	God	was	like	by	analogy.	Of	course,	many	in	the	Roman	
Catholic	tradition,	Aquinas	and	many	others,	accepted	the	theory	of	
what	we	 call	 analogy.	 Indeed	Bishop	Butler,	 in	Hume’s	 own	 time,	
argued	by	 analogy.	His	main	 argument	was	 that	 if	 the	world	 is	 the	
way	it	is,	God	must	be	somehow	like	it.	The	comparison	he	used	was	
that	of	a	watchmaker	who	designed	creation,	set	it	running	and	then	
stood	back.	That	has	its	attractions.	Or,	on	the	other	hand,	by	way	of	
a	different	analogy,	was	God	completely	and	continually	involved	in	
creation	like	a	parent	bringing	up	children,	who	can’t	stop	meddling?
Hume	 did	 not	 accept	 these	 analogies	 because	 he	wanted	 to	 lay	
stress	on	 the	gap,	 the	huge	gap,	between	 the	 infinite	 and	 the	finite,	
between	the	eternal	and	what	we	call	the	contingent.	In	his	rejection	
of	these	analogies	he	was,	in	fact,	putting	a	question	mark	against	one	
of	the	main	patterns	of	argument	used	in	English	thinking.	There	was	
a	whole	 historical	 tradition	 behind	 that	 to	which	 one	 could	 appeal.	
Just	like	the	bees	having	a	queen	bee	who	rules	in	the	hive,	the	church	
required	an	equivalent.	At	least,	this	was	what	was	argued	by	James	
Law,	Bishop	of	Orkney.	He	maintained	 that	you	need	 the	 rule	of	 a	
bishop	 –	without	 such	 a	 central	 figure	 the	 church	 cannot	 function.	
Hume	rejected	this	form	of	argument	by	analogy.	
Reid,	on	the	other	hand,	didn’t.	In	his	discussion	concerning	the	
legitimising	of	moral	convictions,	beliefs	and	the	nature	of	the	structure	
of	society,	Reid’s	method	was	to	examine	the	human	mind	and	see	how 
it worked.	In	doing	so,	he	developed	the	notion	of	‘common	sense’.	
We	naturally	associate	this	with	‘the	Scottish	philosophy’,	not	always	
quite	realising	that	it	means,	basically,	the	analysis	and	examination	
of	 the	human	mind.	That	was	Reid’s	method,	 though	he	 refused	 to	
accept	that	there	were	analogies	to	be	drawn	between	how	the	mind	
works	and	 the	way	 the	physical	world	works.	 If	you	 read	his	great	
works	of	philosophy,	however,	he	is	actually	examining	the way the 
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mind works	and	by	natural	extension	how	language	works.	That	was	
where	he	thought	the	clues	to	the	basic	questions	and	the	answers	to	
them	were	to	be	found.	
So,	there	was	Reid	rejecting	one	kind	of	analogy	between	the	mind	
and	the	physical	world	and	Hume	rejecting	other	kinds	of	analogies	
between	the	physical	world	and	the	way	in	which	God	had	brought	
about	 creation.	Hume’s	 key	 argument	 there,	 is	 so	 fundamental,	 I’ll	
try	to	summarise	it	very	quickly.	In	the	Dialogues	he	has	one	of	the	
characters	use	the	following	argument:	‘Of	course	we	know	what	God	
is	like.	We	see	the	clues.	There	seems	to	me	to	be	a	mind	operating	
behind	nature.	Otherwise,	how	would	all	this	work	in	the	simple	and	
clever	ways	it	does?’	In	the	Dialogues,	Philo	the	sceptic	says,	‘Ah	yes,	
you	believe	this	reveals	something	about	God’.	Then	he	goes	on	to	say	
that	the	more	the	mind	that	planned	nature	is	like	a	human	mind	that	
made	a	watch	or	clock,	the	stronger	the	argument.	If	that	is	the	case,	
continues	 Philo,	 ‘you	 have	 denied	 the	 transcendency	 of	 God.	 The	
stronger	the	argument	that	the	mind	of	God	is	like	the	mind	of	man,	
the	more	His	transcendency	is	reduced.’	Here	we	touch	on	the	essence	
of	Hume’s	rejection	of	analogies	drawn	from	the	world.	To	say	God	is	
like	the	Great	Watchmaker	in	the	sky	is	ultimately	demeaning	because	
it	affects	the	transcendency	of	God.	Hume’s	rejection	of	analogy,	then,	
also	has	its	origins	in	the	joint,	common	legacy.	
Hume	and	Reid’s	thinking
Hume	rejected	the	traditional	ways	of	establishing	where	truth	lies	in	
relation	 to	 society	 and	 to	moral	 conviction.	This	 rejection	 included	
relying	on	revealed	religion	as	a	source.	In	this	way	he	made	many	
enemies.	 The	 Establishment	 of	 the	 day	 refused	 to	 let	 the	 greatest	
philosopher	that	ever	lived	in	Britain,	become	a	professor	in	Edinburgh	
or	Glasgow.	The	toun	council	wouldn’t	accept	his	appointment.	There	
is	something	ironic	in	that!	Sometimes	he	rejected	religion,	but	this	was	
not	necessarily	a	rejection	of	God.	He	rejected	religion	as	a	source	for	
moral	values	or	the	shape	of	the	good	society.	He	rejected,	as	Newton	
had	 done,	 purely	 rational	 argument,	 declaring	 that	 ‘the	 distinction	
between	moral	evil	and	moral	good	is	not	founded	on	logic’.	We	all	
like	to	think	moral	people	are	reasonable	people	but	Hume	warned	us	
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not	to	take	that	too	far.	He	rejected	religion,	rationalism	and	the	pure	
appeal	to	reason.	There	he	was,	then,	pulling	out	all	the	plugs	on	which	
people	had	founded	their	understanding	of	the	world	and	on	how	you	
draw	distinctions	between	good	and	evil.	Reid	pulled	out	many	of	the	
same	plugs.	Reid’s	answer,	however,	was	a	version	of	what	we	have	
come	to	call	‘common	sense’.	Reid	didn’t	understand	‘common	sense’	
as	 straight	 intuition,	 pure	 and	 un-maligned.	 He	 thought	 this	 sense	
should	be	subject	to	further	education.	However,	he	too	rejected	the	
traditional	approaches	to	how	to	draw	moral	distinctions	and	replaced	
it	with	the	creation	of	‘a	sensitivity	of	the	mind’	that,	in	turn,	could	
draw	the	required	distinctions.	
In	similar	ways	Hume	developed	the	concept	which	Adam	Smith	
made	much	of	–	‘sympathy’.	Hume’s	view	of	human	beings	(and	there	
is	something	of	Calvin	here	I	think)	was	that	on	the	whole	we	are	a	bit	
of	a	bad	lot.	While	he	never	used	the	language	of	original	sin	he	did	
think	we	were	capable	of	pretty	bad	things	as	his	reading	of	history	
shows.	In	the	same	way	he	thought	that	since	we	are	capable	of	bad	
things	so	what	we	have	to	learn	to	do	is	amend	or	redirect	our	view	or	
sense	of	the	world	by	trying	to	understand	the	other	through	sympathy.	
Hume	argues	that	we	all	have	that	capacity	and	that	we	have	to	learn	
by	 the	extension	of	 this	capacity of sympathy	 to	 take	ourselves	out	
of	the	middle	of	the	picture	in	realising	that	these	distinctions	apply	
to	 human	 beings	 wherever	 and	 whoever	 they	 are,	 wherever	 and	
whenever	they	lived,	even	if	they	seem	unlike	us.	This	‘moving	of	us	
out	of	the	centre’	became	the	key	for	Hume	of	how	to	develop	moral	
sensitivities	further.
	
Four	basics	for	civil	society	to	work
Let	me	conclude.	One	can	detect	here,	perhaps,	a	Calvinistic	influence	
regarding	 the	 self.	 It	 is	 thought,	 reasonably	 correctly	 I	 think,	 that	
Hume	had	read	the	whole	of	Human Nature in its Fourfold State by	
Thomas	Boston.	This	was	the	one	of	the	great	tracts	of	the	time	and	
Hume	judged,	as	a	youth,	his	whole	moral	development	against	this	
very	Calvinistic	picture.	That	is,	the	capacity	to	remove	oneself	from	
the	centre	of	the	scene	and	have	the	appropriate	sympathy	when	it’s	
another	 parent’s	 child	who	 is	 suffering,	 or	 the	neighbour	who	 is	 in	
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difficulty	or	needs	your	help.	Hume	asked	himself	the	question,	and	
here	I’m	speculating	a	bit	because	he	didn’t	write	it	down	in	this	way,	
‘What	are	the	conditions	required	for	(what	we	call)	civil	society	to	be	
built,	maintained	and	sustained	over	the	generations?’	He	isn’t	asking	
how	we	have	arrived	at	this	point,	but	how	to	get	there.	He	came	to	
some	amazing	conclusions,	in	a	way.	
First	–	we	learn	that	in	a	family,	the	‘self’	isn’t	in	the	middle	of	the	
picture	all	the	time.	In	a	family	you	begin	to	realise	that	you	cannot	
be	a	 two-year-old	all	your	 life	–	where	 there’s	only	one	person	and	
that’s	me!	He	more	or	less	argues	that	it’s	in	the	family	that	we	begin	
to	realise	the	nuances	and	distinctions	of	social	life.	(How	traditional!)
Second	–	through	education.	Hume	didn’t	think	education	was	perfect	
by	any	means	and	he	thought	there	was	such	a	thing	as	bad	education	
and	good	education.	Through	education,	however,	we	extend	our	mind	
and	we	begin	to	see	how	others	live.	We	begin	to	see	how	relationships	
might	 be	 different	 in	 the	 process	 of	 interacting	 with	 others,	 first	
in	 the	 family,	 then	within	 a	 system	 of	 education.	 Language	 is	 also	
included	in	this	process	because	unless,	in	a	system	of	education,	we	
develop	 a	means	 of	 articulating	 to	 others	 and	 learning	 from	 others	
how	decisions	are	made	and	views	formed,	we	will	have	lost	a	sense	
that	is	fundamental	to	society.	Hume	paid	a	lot	of	attention	to	language	
and	the	subtleties	of	language	and	wrote	beautifully	–	there	are	always	
profound	nuances	in	the	points	that	he	makes.	
Third	–	Hume	pointed	out	that	if	you	are	going	to	have	a	civil	society	
that	works	 there	are	 two	or	 three	 things	 that	you	have	got	 to	have.	
One	is	a	concept	of	justice.	What	is	appropriate	in	the	relationships	
between	human	beings?	The	modern	word,	 I	 suppose,	 is	 ‘fairness’,	
though	Hume	had	serious	doubts	about	notions	of	absolute	equality.	
Justice	–	how	do	I	know	that	the	demands	I	make	on	others	and	the	
demands	that	they	make	on	me	are	legitimate	and	can	be	sustained	in	
the	society	in	which	we	live?	The	answer	to	that	involves	a	concept	
of	 justice.	 In	English	 law,	 as	 you	will	 recall,	 this	 is	 established	 by	
referring	to	traditions	and	precedents.	This	is	also	true	of	Scottish	law,	
but	 in	addition	to	this	were	included	the	first	principles	from	which	
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law	is	derived.	A	reasonable	notion	of	justice	is	fundamental	to	any	
society.
Fourth	 –	 you	 have	 to	 have	 common	 a	 understanding	 concerning	
property.	Who	 owns	 what?	Who	 has	 a	 legitimate	 claim	 to	 what?	
In	 what	 proportions?	 Here,	 Hume	 placed	 property	 in	 relation	 to	
definitions	of	appropriateness,	legality,	fairness	and	the	justice	of	who	
can	have	what,	and	this	is	fundamental	to	any	civil	society.	It	is	at	this	
point	that	Hume	identified	greed	as	the	most	dangerous	of	the	vices	
because	of	its	potential	to	destroy	society.	
We’ll	 return	 to	 greed	 later,	 for	 the	moment,	 however,	 the	 other	
significant	point	Hume	made	concerns	what	it	is	to	be	an	empiricist.	
Hume	turned	this	into	a	form	of	pragmatism,	particularly	in	his	views	
of	monarchy.	He	was	a	close	friend	of	many	French	intellectuals	and	
he	was	 also	 a	 great	 supporter	 of	 the	American	 Revolution,	 though	
he	 died	 before	 the	 Declaration	 of	 Independence	 was	 signed	 in	
1776.	A	question	 that	was	sometimes	put	 to	him,	given	his	 support	
of	 the	American	Revolution	 and	developments	 in	France,	was	why	
he	was	not	a	Republican	here	 in	Britain.	Hume’s	response	was	 that	
the	powers	of	 the	monarchy	 in	 this	country	had	been	progressively	
limited	through	the	course	of	history,	such	that	they	were	no	longer	the	
absolute	powers	that	afflicted	the	French.	So,	Hume	is	a	pragmatist!	
That	was	Hume’s	pragmatic	reading	of	history.	We	live	in	a	society,	in	
a	world	where	we	try	to	be	pragmatic	–	so	‘If	it	ain’t	broke	don’t	fix	
it’.	That	was	Hume’s	view	on	the	monarchy.
Conclusion
To	conclude	–	consider	Hume’s	basic	 requirements	 for	 the	 survival	
of	 civil	 society	 and	 think	 of	 the	 riots	 last	 summer	 in	 London	 and	
elsewhere.	Hume	has	certain	points	which	I	 think	are	relevant.	One	
of	them	is:	If	society	is	being	driven	by	greed,	whether	the	greed	of	
the	 looters	 or	 of	 those	who	 insist	 on	 exorbitant	 levels	 of	 pay,	 then	
you	will	 begin	 to	destroy	 society.	Could	 that	 be	what	 is	 happening	
now?	What	 the	bankers	 are	getting	up	 to	 could	be	very	destructive	
of	society.	Without	an	understanding	of	what	 level	of	ownership	of	
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property	is	appropriate	across	society,	social	coherence	may	begin	to	
be	weakened.	If	you	don’t	have	a	sense	of	justice	that	can	be	applied	
in	society	then	similar	problems	arise.	If	you	do	not	have	the	family	
as	one	of	the	basic	training	grounds	of	moral	sensitivity	then	you	will	
need	something	to	replace	that	urgently.	If	you	look	at	the	accounts	
of	 those	who	were	 arrested	many	of	 them	come	 from	backgrounds	
where	the	family	no	longer	functioned.	If	you	look	at	the	educational	
background	 a	 huge	proportion	 of	 those	 arrested	 had	been	 regularly	
excluded	from	school.	Now,	I’m	not	getting	into	the	argument	as	to	
whose	fault	this	is.	What	I	am	saying	is	that	Hume	points	us	to	certain	
basic	conditions	for	civil	society.	If	the	education	system	leaves	up	to	
half	the	population	without	an	adequate	basis	for	finding	employment,	
then	there	is	something	wrong	with	it.	If	you	do	not	have	the	structures	
that	were	 traditionally	 provided	 by	 families	 then	 there’s	 something	
wrong.	
Hume’s	argument	is	that	these	four	elements	–	family,	education,	a	
system	of	justice,	and	an	ordered	relation	to	property	–	can	work	very	
positively	in	society.	If	we	let	these	go,	then	we	will	need	to	provide	
an	alternative.	I	don’t	think	there	are	alternatives	to	a	sense	of	justice,	
a	decent	definition	of	property	and	so	on,	but	these	alternatives	may,	
of	course,	form	the	proper	subject	of	reasoned	discussion.	In	terms	of	
relevance,	however,	David	Hume	still	has	much	to	contribute	to	that	
ongoing	debate.
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